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Abstract
Neoclassical economics has two theories of competition between profit-maximizing
firms (Marshallian and Cournot-Nash) that start from different premises about the
degree of strategic interaction between firms, yet reach the same result, that market
price falls as the number of firms in an industry increases. The Marshallian argument
is strictly false. We integrate the different premises, and establish that the optimal
level of strategic interaction between competing firms is zero. Simulations support
our analysis and reveal intriguing emergent behaviors.
PACS Code: 89.65.Gh
Key words: Microeconomics, Profit Maximization, Competition, Monopoly,
Oligopoly, Cournot-Nash Game Theory
1 A popular fallacy
The underlying assumption of the Marshallian model is that the ith firm in a
competitive industry does not react strategically to the hypothetical actions
of other firms. In an n firm industry where the output of the ith firm is qi, this
assumption, known as “atomism” or “price-taking”,[1, pp. 314, 383] means
that ∂qi
∂qj
= 0 ∀i 6= j. This model then claims that the market demand function
P (Q) (where Q =
n∑
i=1
qi) has the dual properties that P
′ (Q) < 0 and P ′ (qi) =
0 for large n. Elementary calculus shows this is false:
dP
dqi
=
dP
dQ
dQ
dqi
(1)
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where
dQ
dqi
= 1 given ∂qi
∂qj
= 0 ∀i 6= j. Therefore
dP
dqi
=
dP
dQ
([2]).
This false belief is essential to the Marshallian derivation of the model of “per-
fect competition”, which occurs when P (Q)—the marginal benefit to society—
equals the marginal cost of production MC (Q).[1, p. 322] The derivation
starts from the proposition that a profit maximizing firm will produce where
its Marginal Cost
(
d
dqi
TC (qi)
)
equals its Marginal Revenue
(
d
dqi
(P (Q) qi)
)
:
pineo :
d
dqi
pi (qi) =MR (qi)−MC (qi) = 0 (2)
Given this alleged profit-maximization rule and the “assumption” that P ′ (qi) =
0, it followed that for perfect competition, price equalled marginal cost. Since
the assumption is logically incompatible with P ′ (Q) < 0, the Marshallian
derivation of perfect competition fails.
The Cournot-Nash model is not dependent on this fallacy, arguing instead
that strategic interactions lead to a Nash equilibrium in which market price
converges to marginal cost as the number of firms increases ([3]; [1, pp. 411-
413.])—though this process is, at best, highly conditional at best (see [1, pp.
417-423]). Standard neoclassical analysis assumes that firms will strategically
interact, and calculates the ith firm’s best response on this basis under various
conditions. We instead treat ∂qi
∂qj
, the response of the ith firm to a hypothetical
change in output by the jth, as a decision variable, and consider what is its
optimal value of ∂qi
∂qj
for a profit-maximizing firm. As a preliminary, we show
that the proposition that (2) maximizes profits for the ith firm is false.
2 The true profit maximization formula
In a multi-firm industry, the profit maximum is given by the zero, not of its
partial derivative, but its total derivative—since the actions of other firms
affect the profitability of any given firm, even though (or rather, especially
because) the ith firm cannot control what the other firms in the industry do.
Maximizing profit while ignoring what other firms do is rather like rowing
a boat to a specific location while ignoring the wind and tides. The profit
maximum for the ith firm is therefore given by:
d
dQ
pi (qi) =
d
dQ
(P (Q) qi − TC (qi)) = 0 (3)
2
Since Q =
n∑
j=1
qj , (3) can be expanded to
n∑
j=1

 ∂
∂qj

P

 n∑
j=1
qj

 qi − TC (qi)

 dqj
dQ

 = 0 (4)
Converting (4) into an expression in terms of reaction coefficients ∂qi
∂qj
yields:
P
n∑
j=1
(
∂qi
∂qj
n∑
k=1
∂qj
∂qk
)
+ qi
dP
dQ
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
∂qj
∂qk
−MC (qi)
n∑
j=1
∂qi
∂qj
= 0 (5)
With the Marshallian assumption of “atomism”, ∂qi
∂qj
= 0 ∀i 6= j, and equation
(5) reduces to
P + nqi
dP
dQ
−MC (qi) = 0 (6)
This contradicts the neoclassical belief, epitomized by (2), that, in the context
of atomistic behavior, profit is maximized by equating marginal revenue and
marginal cost. (6) can be rearranged to yield:
MR (qi)−MC (qi) =
n− 1
n
(P −MC (qi)) (7)
This equals zero only in the case of a monopoly—which is the one time that
the accepted Marshallian formula is correct. At all other times, the profit
maximum for an individual firm will occur where “marginal revenue” exceeds
“marginal cost”. As a consequence, the Marshallian model leads to industry
output being independent of the number of firms in it.
In Cournot-Nash game theoretic analysis, firms decide their own actions on
the basis of the expected reactions of other firms, in such a way that each firm’s
“best response” is to setMR (qi) = MC (qi). In our terms, this is equivalent to
setting ∂qi
∂qj
=
1
nE
—where E is the market elasticity of demand (E =
P
Q
dQ
dP
).
Our equation (5) lets us combine Marshallian and Cournot-Nash analysis, by
treating ∂qi
∂qj
as a decision variable whose optimum value can be identified by
the firm. In this paper, we consider an industry of n identical firms (a common
heuristic device in economic theory) so that ∂qi
∂qj
= θ ∀i 6= j and ∂qi
∂qi
= 1, where
3
θ can take on any value. Then (5) reduces to:
(n− 1)Pθ + P + nqi
dP
dQ
= MC (qi) (8)
This defines the maximum profit achievable by the individual firm in the
context of strategic behavior—if each firm reacts to output changes by other
firms with a reaction coefficient of θ. We can now consider what value of θ
would be chosen by a profit-maximizing firm. It transpires that the optimum
value of this parameter is in fact zero.
3 True profit-maximizing behavior
The optimum value for θ for the ith firm occurs where d
dθ
pi (qi) = 0. This
condition reduces to:
d
dθ
pi (qi) =
1
n
d
dθ
Q
(
P + nqi
dP
dQ
−MC (qi)
)
(9)
Since it can be shown that d
dθ
Q 6= 0, (9) equals zero iff P+nqi
dP
dQ
−MC (qi) = 0.
As established above, this requires that θ = 0. Firms thus achieve higher
profits if they do not react strategically to each other. In the classic words
of the movie War Games, firms may conclude that Cournot-Nash strategic
interaction is “A curious game. The only winning strategy is not to play.” We
consider this question using a multi-agent model of instrumentally rational
profit maximizers facing comparable marginal cost functions.
4 Operationally rational profit-maximizers
Our hypothetical market has a linear demand curve (P = a− bQ) and a given
number n of profit-maximizing agents. Firm i chooses an initial output level
qi,0 and a fixed amount by which to vary output at each step δqi. If profit falls
after an iteration, i reverses the sign of δqi for the next iteration.
1 Total cost
1 The programs for this paper can be downloaded from
www.debunking-economics.com/totf.
4
functions for the firms are identical:
tc (q, n) = k + Cq +
1
2
Dnq2 +
1
3
En2q3 (10)
In the following simulations, a = 800 and b = 10−7, k = 106, C = 10,
D = 10−8and E = 10−17 and n ranges between 5 and 100 (higher values made
no significant difference to our results.); the fixed δqi for each firm is drawn
from a normal distribution N (m, σ) where m = 0 and σ is a given fraction
of the Cournot prediction. Monte Carlo simulations reveal a rich range of in-
teractions, and in general show that instrumentally rational profit-maximizers
will learn “not to play” the Cournot-Nash game. For low σ, output converges
to the “Keen” equilibrium given by (6) for all values of n (Figure 1).
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Fig. 1. Outcome of Monte Carlo simulations with low dispersal of δq (2% Cournot)
However, as σ rises from 1% to 20% of the Cournot prediction, the outcome
shifts from the Keen to the Cournot level (Figure 2). Aggregate and individual
agent behavior also becomes much more unstable, as Figure 3 indicates. We
surmise that the “emergent collusion” we identified in [4] breaks down as δq
rises; perhaps the increasing size of unpredictable output changes by other
firms makes the overall market environment more chaotic, forcing each firm
to rely more on feedback from its own output.changes.
5 Conclusion
Contrary to the beliefs of the vast majority of economists, equating marginal
revenue and marginal cost is not profit-maximizing behavior, the number of
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Fig. 2. Convergence to Cournot-Nash prediction as δq rises with constant n = 50
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Fig. 3. Comparative stability of average firm for different values of δq
firms in an industry has no discernible impact on the quantity produced, the
“deadweight loss of welfare” exists regardless of how many firms there are
in the industry, and instrumentally rational profit-maximizers do not play
Cournot-Nash games. Moving from Hollywood to The Bard, it appears that
the dominant theory of the firm is “Much Ado About Nothing”.
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